Over the course of the recent liquidity crisis, the Federal Reserve made several changes to its primary credit lending facility such as narrowing the spread between the primary credit rate and the target funds rate, increasing the terms of lending, and widening the range of acceptable collateral. In this paper, we use the model developed by Artuç and Demiralp (2008) to provide a structural assessment of the effectiveness of these changes. Our results suggest that most of these changes were highly effective in stabilizing the federal funds market.
Introduction
In response to the recent liquidity crisis, central banks designed a variety of tools for supplying liquidity to financial institutions. The Federal Reserve introduced several programs such as the Term Auction Facility, the Term Securities Lending Facility, and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility while enhancing the discount window and open market operations. This paper focuses on the effects of changes in the discount window facility on financial markets. We investigate whether the improvements constitute a fundamental change to the way the Federal Reserve traditionally provided liquidity through the primary credit lending facility and try to answer whether the Federal Reserve would be well-served to keep these changes to its borrowing facility indefinitely.
In January 2003, the Federal Reserve revised its discount window lending program. This facility was intended to improve the working of the discount window which had lost its functionality under the old regime prior to 2003 . Before 2003 borrowing from the Fed took place at a rate below the market rate (called the "discount rate"), and Fed officials applied a non-price rationing mechanism by asking detailed questions to potential borrowers about their financial well-being before granting them a loan. Slowly, this administrative process pushed depository institutions away from the discount window because borrowing from the Fed was perceived as a signal of financial weakness by market participants (see e.g. Goodfriend, 1983; Pearce, 1993; Dutkowsky, 1993; Peristiani, 1998; Clouse and Dow, 1999; Furfine, 2003; Dow, 2001; Darrat et al., 2004) .
The new borrowing facility was designed to eliminate the reluctance to borrow from the Fed with a new "no questions asked" policy towards eligible borrowers.
However, despite the assurance by the Fed that the new facility would eliminate all administrative costs of borrowing, some argued that the stigma could not be eliminated completely (see e.g. Furfine, 2001 Furfine, , 2003 . Recently, Artuç and Demiralp (2008) investigated this question and showed that the stigma of borrowing that was attributable to the Fed's administrative policy and restrictions declined substantially in the period after 2003.
In this paper, we rely on the model developed by Artuç and Demiralp (2008) as our baseline model and perform out of sample simulations to asses the effects of changes in the primary credit facility since August 2007. Our results are highly consistent with the predictions in Artuç and Demiralp (2008) that the new discount window is functional and and plays an essential role in controlling the volatility in the federal funds market.
Recent Changes in the Primary Credit Facility
The primary credit facility that is established in 2003 offered credit to banks in good financial conditions at a rate that was 100 basis points above the FOMC's target federal funds rate ("primary credit rate"). Primary credit was made available to financially sound depository institutions at an above-market rate but with very little administration and no restrictions on the use of the proceeds (see Madigan and Nelson, 2002) . Because the interest rate charged on primary credit was above the market price of funds, it replaced the rationing mechanism for obtaining funds from the central bank and eliminated any administrative review by the Fed.
In the outbreak of the liquidity crisis in August 2007, the Federal Reserve lowered the spread between the primary credit rate and the target funds rate from 100 to 50 basis points and extended the terms of the loans to 30 days. In March 2008, the Federal Reserve once again narrowed the spread, this time to 25 basis points and extended the maximum term of loans to 90 days. Recently in September 2008, the Federal Reserve broadened the types of eligible collateral for discount window borrowing. All of these moves were motivated with the desire to make the discount window credit more accessible to depository institutions.
The steps taken by the Federal Reserve to make discount window credit more accessible did lead to an increase in the volume of discount window borrowing, as shown in Figure 1 . The upper panel in the figure shows total outstanding primary credit since the establishment of the facility in 2003. Due to the enormous increase in borrowing during the crisis period, the middle and the lower panels split the sample period in August 2007 to make the earlier period more visible.
While the massive increase in the volume of borrowing supports the argument that the stigma of borrowing has been eliminated, one should be cautious in not declaring a victory too quickly. Figure 2 shows the highest traded funds rate against the primary credit rate. It reflects that despite the enormous increase in the volume of borrowing, some trades in the funds market took place at rates above the primary credit rate on occasion. What is comforting about these findings, however, is that they are consistent with the predictions of our earlier work. As indicated in Artuç and Demiralp (2008) , the reluctance to borrow from the Federal Reserve has two components. The non-price mechanism that is described earlier is the component that is attributable to the Federal Reserve officials' implementation of discount lending. Artuç and Demiralp (2008) showed that this component has declined significantly after the establishment of the new facility in 2003. Meanwhile, a second type of stigma arises from the asymmetric information problems associated with discount window borrowing. Specifically, while most banks borrow from the discount window, sometimes the facility is also used by troubled or failing institutions.
Because market participants cannot fully differentiate healthy from troubled borrowers, they may view borrowing as a potential sign of weakness for any bank that visits the window. If this type of stigma increases at the early stages of a financial crisis while the institutions are trying to signal that they are in good shape, it could explain the spikes in the funds rate over the primary credit rate as seen in Figure 1 .
1 In addition, it is plausible to think that the capital crunch during a financial crisis may leave some institutions without sufficient collateral to apply for a primary credit loan and hence these institutions may bid for higher rates in the federal funds market, which is unsecuritized.
The Model
The model that we describe in this section closely resembles the one developed in Artuç and Demiralp (2008) , which can be viewed as an extension of the model proposed by Clouse and Dow (1999) . More details about the model can be found in Artuç and Demiralp (2008) . We consider a simple framework where bank i's goal is to keep its daily reserves holdings at a level . Daily reserve balances do vary over the course of the maintenance period (see Carpenter and Demiralp, 2006 In addition to borrowings from the Federal Reserve that are driven by market conditions, there are also borrowings due to technical difficulties such as network problems which force banks to borrow from the Fed regardless of market conditions.
In order to capture this type of borrowing, we assume that a random fraction, , of the banks will face a technical problem in the system where has a uniform distribution:
We assume that there is a continuum of banks, indexed from 0 to 1. Thus there are an infinite number of banks with zero individual measure whose measure integrates to 1. Indexing is done according to reserve balance levels such that a bank with the lowest level of reserve balances is indexed to 0 and the one with the highest level of reserve balances is indexed to 1. Figure 3 shows the distribution of these banks according to their balance levels. Accordingly, those with reserve balances higher than L supply funds in the fed funds market, where the total supply is the area of the triangle on the right. Meanwhile, those with balances lower than L demand funds. There is a threshold level T such that banks with reserve shortages greater than T go to the discount window. Hence, the area of the trapezoid shows the demand for funds from the Fed, while the triangle adjacent to the trapezoid shows the demand for funds from the market. In the figure, we omit one dimension of the model, which is borrowing from the Fed due to technical difficulties. The actual demand from the market is the area of the triangle on the left times (1-p).
Total demand for funds has two components. It can be met in the funds market or it can be met at the discount window. Total supply of funds in the funds market needs to be at least as big as the size of total borrowing in the funds market.
The equilibrium federal funds rate, , is determined by the market equilibrium when the total supply of funds is equal to the total demand for funds. In modeling the borrowing behavior, our focus is on individual trades in the funds market and on days t r of market tightness because these are the days on which borrowing from the Fed are more likely. Therefore, we set the daily high funds rate equal to:
Equation (2) notes that the maximum funds rate that is registered for a given day will differ from the equilibrium funds rate depending on the reserve need and the bargaining power faced by the counterparties of that particular trade.
Turning to the days of market softness, on these days trades are almost always cleared in the funds market unless there is a technical problem. For that reason and without loss of generality, if the supply is larger than the demand, we simply set the funds rate ( ) equal to the marginal benefit of holding balances ( The decline in fed funds volatility is also influenced by certain other developments over time such as better liquidity management by the Trading Desk (see Demiralp and Farley, 2004) , improvements in internal information systems (including those that track the balance in a bank's Federal Reserve account), or banking industry 4 In the estimation of the model, we set γ equal to the federal funds rate target.
consolidation. To capture such changes, at least partially, we allow the distributions of and to get wider or narrower in a linear fashion over time. That is we let:
where t is the time trend, and are defined after equation 1. Moments (or GMM) can be considered as special cases of II. Note that an auxiliary model does not need to be "correct" for II to give consistent results. So long as the selected auxiliary model summarizes the data well, the estimates of the actual model will be consistent and asymptotically normal (for more details on II, see Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault, 1993; Smith, 1993) . Let be an OLS estimate of from the actual data and be an estimate of from the simulated data. We pick the model's parameters such that is minimized, where W is the weighting matrix that is equal to the inverse of the covariance matrix of
In estimating the model, we exclude those days when the daily high rate exceeded the target rate by more than 25% to obtain a more realistic distribution for the shocks in the model. Our estimation results (shown in the appendix) suggest that the implicit fixed cost of borrowing declines about 90 percent (from 0.054 to 0.007) after the policy change in 2003. This is strong evidence that the Fed's new policy was indeed successful in reducing the stigma associated with discount window borrowing.
Simulation Analysis
In this section, we use our model to analyze the role of the Federal Reserve's primary credit lending facility in calming money markets in the face of the liquidity crisis. Specifically, we ask the following questions: We first remind that the model described in the previous section is designed to capture the "normal times" of healthy functioning markets. Our estimation period The sizable gap between the data and the simulations for the crisis period suggest that we should first incorporate the crisis circumstances into our model before we can conduct any counterfactual experiments about the efficiency of the Federal
Reserve's policies. During the crisis, it is natural to expect the volatility of the aggregate shock to increase. Furthermore, the widening of the range of eligible collateral as well as the increase in the terms of lending are expected to reduce the implicit costs of borrowing by making it more convenient to apply for and lenghten the duration of a loan. When we double the standard error of the aggregate shock and reduce the costs of borrowing by one half, we obtain much more reasonable estimates for the interest rate spread and the volume of borrowing for the crisis period (Figures 6 and 7) . We call our results from this exercise the benchmark simulations. Turning from prices to quantities, the volume of borrowing cannot be different between the two regimes because banks need to borrow the necessary amount of reserve balances to avoid an overdraft or a reserve deficiency in our model. For this reason, in reporting our simulation results we only present the spread between the daily high funds rate and the target rate and do not show the borrowing behavior when the latter is unaffected under different scenarios.
Next, we analyze the effectiveness of the changes in the primary credit facility that the Federal Reserve has introduced since the beginning of the crisis. Recall that our benchmark model implied a 50% decline in borrowing costs during the crisis period. In assessing the implications of extended terms of borrowing and a wider set of eligible collateral, we keep the cost of borrowing at its pre-crisis level and simulate the interest rate spread under this scenario. Figure 9 displays the results from this exercise. The elevated volatility under the counterfactual scenario indicates that extending the terms of borrowing and the list of eligible collateral were very effective means in controlling the volatility in the funds market.
While the terms of borrowing were extended, the Federal Reserve also narrowed the spread between the primary credit rate and the target rate from 100 basis points to 25 basis points over the course of the crisis. Our earlier findings in Artuç and Demiralp (2008) would suggest that the primary credit rate works as an upper bound in the absence of market stigma and that a decline in this rate should decrease deviations of the funds rate from the target. Our next simulation keeps the spread between the primary credit rate and the target unchanged at 100 basis points. As shown in Figure 10 , the counterfactual spread is at least as high as the benchmark simulation, if not higher. This elevated volatility suggests that narrowing the spread was effective, even though the difference is not as outstanding as in the previous experiments probably due to the increased need for collateral under the crisis circumstances. That is, because federal funds borrowing is unsecuritized whereas discount window borrowing requires collateral, certain banks may still need to borrow in the funds market by paying a higher premium if they do not have the sufficient collateral for discount borrowing.
Recently, the Federal Reserve has been granted the authority to pay interest on reserve balances. In addition to placing a lower bound on the funds rate, interest payments on reserve balances are expected to increase the demand for balances simply because the cost of holding these balances are now lower. Our last exercise considers the impact of a higher level of balances in controlling the funds rate volatility. While it is hard to guess the precise magnitude of the change in reserve balances, we increase the average normalized reserve balances by 10% in our counterfactual experiment. Figure 11 shows that the control over interest rates improve while Figure 12 shows that the need for borrowing declines if the average balance holdings increase as predicted under this new regime. Together, these results suggest that any policy change that causes an increase in reserve holdings, such as interest payment on reserves, is quite helpful in controlling money markets.
Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the effectiveness of various changes adopted by the Federal Reserve since the outbreak of the liquidity crisis in August 2007. We showed that the extensions of the terms of borrowing and the list of eligible collateral were the most effective tools in calming the money market while narrowing of the spread between the primary credit rate and the target was not as effective. Would the Federal
Reserve be well-served to keep these changes to its borrowing facility indefinitely?
Our results suggest that the spread between the primary credit rate and the target rate can be increased back to 100 basis points without much impact on financial markets.
One might also argue that the wider set of acceptable collateral is probably a factor that matters the most under crisis circumstances and it would not be of vital importance once the crisis is put behind. Meanwhile, the recent policy change of interest payment on reserves should make it easier for the Desk to maintain the target permanently, not only by placing a lower bound for the funds rate but also by increasing the required reserve balances which more predictable relative to transactions-related demand. In turn, this higher level of balances should reduce the demand for borrowing and the ease the consequent tightness in the funds market. (not shown). However, the trend terms associated with the implicit cost of borrowing were not significant in either sample. This finding suggests that there may not be a gradual adjustment to the new regime in the second sample, similar to our finding in the previous section. We believe that our results may be driven by the fact that we do not have a sufficient number of observations to identify such a time trend.
The third row shows that the aggregate reserve shock changes between -0.43 and +0.43 in the beginning of the sample, while the bank specific reserve shock varies between -0.34 and 0.34 initially (row 4). Rows 5 and 6 show that there is a significant time trend in these shocks. In fact, when we substitute the estimates for D and E in equation 3, we observe that the aggregate reserve shock exhibits a negative trend while the bank specific shock exhibits a positive trend. The estimate of E implies that the standard error of decreases about 0.05% per year while the estimate of D implies that the range of increases about 15% every year. The mild negative time trend in the aggregate shock, , could reflect improvements in the Desk's reserve management ability over time as we noted in the previous section. Row 7 exhibits that the estimated ratio of banks that incur a technical problem, and thus are forced to borrow from Fed rather than the market, vary from 0 to 0.04, indicating that not more than 4% of the banks are affected by this type of a problem at a given point in time. The last row indicates that banks aim to attain a higher level of balances on the last day of the maintenance period, consistent with our expectations. 
